Michael Balint's pioneering work in primary care was not simply the application of psychodynamic theory to the complex problems and relationships encountered by clinicians. Rather, Balint's work was part of a wider conversation in Western epistemology that had already begun to break down the enlightenment rationalist agenda. Since the time of Descartes, we sought to find certain truth through decontextualizing and abstracting problems, and through separation of the observer from the thing observed, with a focus on finding universal timeless laws that could be generalized. By the mid-1950s, it was clear that this agenda was insufficient to answer important questions about what it means to be human and to live a healthy and happy life. Balint's experiment was a return to a method of knowledge creation that is case based, narrative, local, timely, particular, and especially considers specific contexts for finding solutions to problems. For current healthcare reform efforts to be effective, we must include Balint's focus on the context of the doctor, patient, and their relationship, as well as development of practical wisdom (i.e. Aristotelian phronesis) that we know in medicine as professional judgment. The case study method of the Balint group is one of the few and best formal methods to teach and practice this way of knowing.
Introduction
Like all new ideas and theories, those of Michael Balint grew out of a specific time and place. While Balint contributed to the intellectual course of modern Western medicine, especially psychiatry and primary care, he himself had been influenced by the ongoing intellectual, social, and cultural trends of his own place and time. This essay will consider Balint's contributions in light of the context of Western intellectual and cultural history. This perspective will help us to better understand their value to our work in 21st-century healthcare. We will especially look at aspects of Balint work that have to do with epistemology. These are questions of import because our modes of understanding influence our ability to know when and how to act, in normal life as well as the microcosm of the doctor-patient encounter; in turn, this informs us how and what we should be teaching our residents and medical students. Thus, it behooves us to step back to consider how knowledge is created in Balint groups and how it is different than modes of reasoning normally used in medicine.
The enlightenment rationalist agenda: A narrowing of focus
Our understanding of the European transition from a medieval worldview into the world of modernity is a story imprinted from childhood by way of textbooks and popular cultural media. We learned that the "dark" medieval world was marked by ignorance and superstition, the belief that our world was flat, unmoving, with the sun circling round. We learned that philosophers and scientists, beginning with Descartes, began to correct these errors; clearing the slate of previous belief, they sought a new way to understand the world based upon what could be objectively known and through testing the unseen workings of nature with a systematic, empirical methodology. We learned the legend of Galileo muttering in 1633, "And yet, it moves" while standing trial for promoting a non-earth-centered worldview. We learned how Alexander Pope famously declared that "Nature and Nature's laws lay hid in night: God said, Let Newton be! And all was light." We learned that these giants of rationality paved the way for progress and ultimately the "giant leap for mankind" that we know as modernity.
In his 1990 book Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, philosopher of science Stephen Toulmin examines this "received view" of an abrupt transition from medieval thought into a world of enlightenment rationality. Toulmin promotes the idea that Descartes' new epistemology, beginning around 1637 with his "cogito ergo sum," sought a foundation of certainty in an era of religious fanaticism by purposefully ignoring important questions that depend upon metaphysical belief. Beginning with one certainty, that of his own consciousness, Descartes built an epistemology based upon rationality, upon logical and mathematical certainty, that would be universal and applicable to all times and places.
But Toulmin would have us see an intermediate chapter in this step between the medieval and modern world, that of the 16th century renaissance humanists from Erasmus through Shakespeare and especially Michel de Montaigne, the immediate predecessors of Descartes. Toulmin does so in order to highlight what was jettisoned by Descartes' "cogito." He points out that these renaissance writers valued rhetoric, narrative, and knowledge that was rooted in specific time and place, i.e., knowledge that required context. These writers would have denied the likelihood of discovering universal laws that could explain questions of value: Montaigne and other renaissance humanists "saw philosophical questions as reaching beyond the scope of experience in an indefensible way. Faced with abstract, universal, timeless theoretical propositions, they saw no sufficient basis in experience, either for asserting, or denying them." 1 Rather, these writers considered consequential truth to be found in the situational specificity of the case at hand (see Table 1 ). Importantly, during this transitional time, there was "a gradual decrease in the influence of Aristotelian philosophy in deference to a renewed Platonism." 2 The enlightenment rationalist way of knowing has dominated our worldview for several centuries, not in small part because it has been highly successful. By putting blinders on to questions of meaning and metaphysics, by focusing on what could be ascertained with certainty through logic, great advances were made in our ability to dominate and control our world. By way of "naturalists'" taxonomies, the "Encyclopedie" of Diderot and D'Alembert, and Newton's laws of physics, scientific knowledge was translated into technology that radically changed our built world. All this reached a zenith as we moved into the 20th century, the "progressive era," when these perceptions of modernity became the dogma of scientific progress that we received as children.
Healthcare was late to this game, but soon made up for the delay. The first chemical pharmaceutical, aspirin, was marketed in 1899, soon followed by insulin, sulfa antibiotics, and thousands more. Prior to this, "the doctor himself was Commissioned by the American Medical Association and the Carnegie Foundation, the Flexner Report resulted in closing all but 31 of the nation's 155 medical schools as being insufficiently biomedical and continues today to have great influence on medical policy, culture, and education. Soon after 1910, the movement toward medical specialization began. As the century progressed, the medical community presented itself more and more as being "scientific," until this became, in the words of George Engel in 1977, "the dominant folk model of disease in the Western world." 4 Today, elements of the rationalist agenda can be noted in the Evidence Based Medicine movement with its focus on quantifiable, objective outcomes, as well is in attempts to "re-engineer" teambased workflows of the efficient patient-centered medical home, sometimes using processes developed in 1970s automobile factories.
Two distinct ways of knowing
To further this discussion, it will be helpful to highlight two distinctive modes of reasoning that would have been well known in the 16th and 17th centuries. These are explicated in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics in which he described ways in which humans understand and act toward living a fulfilling life (i.e., "the good," or "that at which all things aim"). Among these ways are techne and phronesis. 5 Techne, as it sounds, is best translated as technology or technique. It is a means/end rationality, the end being specified in advance, with emphasis on the method or the technique with which to attain this end. We, the agent, have a firm idea of what is to be made or achieved and come up with the rules needed to achieve it. Techne focuses on solving a problem generally, not specific instances of a problem, and creation of the formula or algorithms needed to solve it. There is "a strong theoretical component-a knowledge of cause and effect in the particular area-that can be taught to other potential craftsmen." 6 Techne is well known in medicine; it has been the strongly emphasized mode of deliberation for the past hundred years. Specific health objectives are defined, preferably with quantifiable outcomes, and methods or algorithms for achieving these are laid out in algorithms and textbooks in ways that can be generalized and taught to learners.
Aristotle distinguished techne from another form of deliberative reason, phronesis. Phronesis is usually defined as "practical wisdom." Whereas techne is concerned with achieving a specific, definable end, phronesis is concerned with guiding action by way of exploring what is good and the right ways to achieve it. Often, with these "doing actions" neither the ends nor the means can be known with certainty in advance of beginning the action-the ends may emerge only as the means are being pursued. Phronesis cannot be taught through facts or rules but rather by establishing good habits in practice, preferably under the guidance of a wise mentor. Phronesis is more akin to learning to play the flute than to learning the rules of geometry or pharmacokinetics.
The renaissance humanists embraced this second way of thinking, preferring truths found in a specific context to theoretical rules that apply universally. Anyone with experience in primary care recognizes that this is the type of deliberation that regularly occurs in exam rooms, even more than application of the theoretical knowledge taught in medical school. Patients present with problems that vary from physical trauma to existential despair, from frustrations and anxieties to life-threatening organic disease, often in combination. They request of us not only repair of bodily damage (when needed or possible) but help interpreting the meaning of their illness in the context of their own life and relationships to the rest of the world. No patient's story fits the descriptions in textbooks. For Aristotle, health, as a subsidiary good to happiness or human flourishing, cannot be understood generally but only within a particular patient's context.
The unraveling
Since the time of Descartes, many marginal voices questioned the sufficiency of the enlightenment worldview-Thoreau would be a notable early example. These voices gathered momentum in the early 20th century. Einstein's theories of relativity were a bellwether. Whereas Galileo proclaimed that the earth revolves around the sun in the firmament, Einstein theorized there really is no firmament, no fixed frame of reference, and that everything moves in relationship to everything else. At the same time, Freud reminded us that human thinking is not always as rational as Descartes would have us believe, that many of our actions are less than consciously reasoned. Piaget studied childhood development to show how humans create their own meaningful worldview by interaction with their early environment. Our golden era of progress was interrupted by two horrific World Wars, revealing a dark side to the technologies with which we master nature. Beginning mid-century, philosophers of science began questioning the adequacy of even the scientific method as a way of describing an unchanging, positivist reality. Thomas Kuhn, in his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 7 and others including Stephen Toulmin argued that even the most rational theories of science are bound by sociocultural context and trends, both explicit and unconscious.
In the 1960s and 1970s, similar voices began to question the adequacy of a rationalist focus for medicine, especially in the realm of primary care. Michael Balint's experiments with general practitioners in the 1950s had a great influence on this thinking. Balint set out to study the occasional problematic encounters and relationships that arose from arranged National Health Service doctor-patient pairings. His research evolved into training seminars consisting of weekly meetings of around eight general practitioners with two psychiatrist leaders. Each session began with one of the doctors relating, without notes, a case that was troubling them; most often, this turned out to be the uncertainty that arose from patient symptoms that did not have clear scientific explanations. After listening to the free-form case presentation, the other participants would hypothesize what might be the unspoken factors (including thoughts and emotions) affecting the relationship and encounter. Balint's 8 own description of the role of the two leaders is telling.
It is hardly an exaggeration to say that if [the leader] finds the right attitude he will teach more by his example than by everything else combined. After all, the technique we advocate is based on exactly the same sort of listening that we expect the doctors to learn and then to practice with their patients. By . . . making his point in a form which, instead of prescribing the right way, opens up possibilities for the doctors to discover by themselves some right way of dealing with the patient's problems -the leader can demonstrate in the "here and now" situation what he wants to teach. (p. 306) Thus, Balint's method depended on exploring the contextual issues affecting this specific doctor, patient, and encounter; group learning took place not through teaching of rules that lead to a known end but rather through modeling of thoughtful listening habits and behaviors. Purposefully or not, Balint questioned the sufficiency of enlightenment rationalist methods to answer questions about patients, concluding that many illnesses did not fit universal, theoretical models but were dependent on the specifics of "the case."
In this same era, many attempted to broaden the medical gaze through systems theory, to consider how the patient's broader contextual systems affected their health. Systems theory was central to George Engel's call for a new "biopsychosocial" model. 4, 9 Given that the most concentrated "system" surrounding a person is their family, the new discipline of Family Medicine sprung forth in 1969. In much of the literature coming from early family medicine academics, Balint's work was highlighted. G Gayle Stephens, a pioneer of the family medicine movement in the United States, wrote in his essay Reflections of a Post-Flexnerian Physician that "Michael Balint, to me, the greatest in this list of teachers. . .. legitimized my life as a post-Flexnerian and gave me the courage and the tools to practice in that style." 10 Narrative approaches 11, 12 conceived in the 1980s also resonated strongly with clinicians. While our patients want to know the pathophysiology of their illness, they also want to know what it means for them and how it will affect their relationships with others and with the world around them. These questions of existential and emotional meaning are best understood in the language of stories. Along these lines, others used anthropologic approaches to show how perceptions of health and illness cannot be defined in terms of broad cultural groupings but rather that every individual is unique, requiring narrative exploration to help bridge the gulf between the clinician's disease model and the patient's illness model. 13 The role of uncertainty in healthcare "The key to understanding medical judgment is knowing that it is fundamentally the management of uncertainty." 14 Even in this age of immediate Internet answers, physicians navigate with imperfect data and limited knowledge that has been described as "the gray-scale space" 15 or "the swampy lowlands." 16 Yet, uncertainty is seldom acknowledged, and its management almost never explicitly taught to physicians at any stage of training. Uncertainty in medical encounters can take many forms. It often arises with regard to the availability or nature of evidence that can be applied to a problem in general. But it is nearly always present in the unspoken patient anxieties that motivate their seeking advice and always present in their unspoken, sometimes unconscious, hopes and desires that we call their healthcare goals. While physicians strive to help patients be healthy, no two persons perceive health in the same way. The Institute for Healthcare Improvement, in its explication of one leg of their "Triple Aim," declared that healthcare quality is determined by "the perspective of an individual member of a defined population." 17 That is, the end of healthcare for each individual is necessarily rooted in a specific place and time, in their own context. This highlights the tension between general care guidelines that can be programmed into electronic health records and the clear need for contextually specific care for an individual. Generalized care guidelines are the subject of techne, but judging when and how to apply guidelines in "the gray-scale space" of a specific patient's life requires phronesis.
The value of our work
In our current climate of healthcare policy and education, considerations of clinical wisdom have been marginalized to near-extinction. No one would argue against the importance of rational thought to improve our place in the world, but techne without phronesis results in unguided mechanical healthcare that can cause disease just as readily as health. Our medical community needs to be reminded that a balance between these two modes of deliberation is necessary in every clinical encounter. This is where Balint groups have a special role in medical education. Balint work focuses our gaze on the "swampy lowlands," on the narrative of the doctor-patient relationship, on "this case," as opposed to rules that apply to a generalizable population.
It is not hard to recognize that the values of Balint groups are exactly those of the renaissance humanists that were rejected by Descartes (see Table 1 ).
Balint groups are case based, specific, and require consideration of patient contexts including the emotional. They teach when and how to tolerate uncertainty and pluralistic thought (especially in individual perceptions of health) and teach how to create imaginative narrative knowledge in specific cases in ways that create meaning. Balint groups not only teach deeper understanding of the relationship, that is, not only create empathy, but also they allow us to practice phronesis skills. In every encounter, the clinician strives to answer the question "who is this person and what do they need at this time to help them fulfill their vision of health?" Despite its "swampiness," this is the question with which a Balint group engages. There may be no correct answer in the technical sense; instead, the group tests, tweaks, and iterates various hypotheses comparing alternate models of clinical reality to see if one has more explanatory power than the other. A Balint group plays out like a living Shakespeare play, full of metaphor and layers of meaning that sometimes become clear, but sometimes raise more questions than when the group began.
Conclusion
When seen in this light, it is clear that Michael Balint had a significant role in medical philosophy in the mid-1900s, paralleling thinkers in other disciplines who challenged the dominance of enlightenment rationalist epistemology over the kind of knowledge created contextually, through "the case." Balint called for a return to the pre-Cartesian values of the renaissance humanists, valuing knowledge that is specific, contextual, and when necessary, tolerant of uncertainty.
Today's medical educators continue to aspire to wearing the mantle of "science," devaluing knowledge that is not based on empiric evidence. But medicine is in fact not a science, but a practice 18 in which many forms of evidence, not exclusive to that created through scientific method, are applied toward the often hazy ends of patient health. Patients demand of us not only the wise application of scientific knowledge to their problems but also the creation of meaning, a narrative about their health and illness that allows them a consistent worldview. Clinicians, even new medical residents, intuitively know that techne, without phronesis, without seeking "the good," is as likely to cause harm as it is to promote true health and that the pretense of certainty in the exam room is just that contributing to moral distress and burnout. Balint groups can be an antidote for this. A Balint group is a role-play in a safe environment that mimics the reality of doctor-patient encounters, exploring the patient context and creating an explanatory model, a narrative that has meaning for the players. These are phronesis skills. Outside of actual patient care, Balint groups are one of the few ways to develop clinical wisdom. Balint groups are phronesis training.
